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Abstract
This paper investigates the consequences for the growth rate and the size of gov-
ernment if a selﬁsh bureaucracy provides a congested production input. Depending
on the bureaucracy’s preferences the budget may be maximized either in the short,
intermediate or long run. Besides, there exists a trade–off between the budget in the
short and the long run. Alternative constitutional settings that represent an exoge-
nously given tax system are introduced in the analysis. It turns out that the welfare
optimum is only met under very speciﬁc assumptions concerning the degree of con-
gestion, the tax system and the planning horizon of the government. For all other
settings the government becomes suboptimally large and even constitutional con-
straints are not apt to discipline the government.
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the framework of a growth model. This allows to disentangle the interaction between
static and dynamic bureaucratic efﬁciency. The economy is described by the following
conditions: (i) It is assumed that the bureaucracy determines the provision of an input
to individual production. This input might be congested. (ii) There are taxes to ﬁnance
the public input. The taxes differ with respect to their impact on intertemporal allocation
and might be growth neutral or growth reducing. (iii) The tax system is exogenous to
the bureaucracy and thus represents constitutional constraints. They might be interpreted
as attempt to discipline the bureaucracy as argued within the Leviathan models. (iv) The
bureaucracy maximizes the available budget. As the formal frame is a dynamic model the
budget may be maximized either in the short, intermediate or the long run. It turns out that
there is a trade–off between short–run and long–run budget that is crucially inﬂuenced by
the constitutional constraints and the bureaucratic preferences but not by congestion. The
feature of congestion gains importance with respect to the welfare implications of selﬁsh
bureaucratic behavior.
The paper might be integrated in the existing literature as follows: Most growth models
with a productive governmental input assume that government’s task only consists of the
efﬁcient provision of the public input. This includes not only the amount but also the cho-
sen ﬁnancing mode that might be used to eliminate or alleviate externalities that arise e. g.
if the input is subject to congestion. The growth impact of ﬁscal policy depends on the
chosen instrument. Usually benevolent behavior of the government is assumed. It deter-
mines the levels of the ﬁscal instruments to realize the Pareto optimum as consequence of
the decentral decisions (see e. g. Barro (1990), Fisher and Turnovsky (1998), Turnovsky
(2000, 1999), Eicher and Turnovsky (2000)). Independent from the degree of congestion
the ﬁrst–best optimum implies a constant relation between private and public sector over
time.
Thiscontradictsempiricalﬁndingswhereupongovernmenthasgrowndramaticallyduring
the last century (see e. g. Holsey and Borcherding (1997) or Mueller (2003) chapter 16
for an overview). Several approaches argue that the growing public sector is the outcome
of an increased demand for public services by the citizens. Other approaches focus on the
1supply side of governmental services and stand in the line of Niskanen (1971) or Romer
and Rosenthal (1978, 1979, 1982). They constitute the budget’s size via selﬁsh behavior
of bureaucrats who maximize the available budget. Bureaucrats form independent parts of
the government and do not aspire to realize a ﬁrst–best situation but pursue own interests.
However, while the models mentioned there are static, the model here is dynamic. Within
a dynamic context it turns out that not only the bureaucracy’s preferences but also the time
limit is important for the resulting governmental behavior.
While budget maximizing, bureaucrats underly several restrictions. Brennan and Buch-
anan (1980) e. g. develop a model in which the government as Leviathan is disciplined by
constitutional constraints. Abstracting from governmental debt further restrictions result
within this paper as the entire revenues might not exceed total output of the private sector.
Generally, constitutional constraints might be realized by several speciﬁcations of the
tax systems (see e. g. Tanzi and Schuhknecht (2000)). In this paper, selﬁsh behavior of
bureaucratsis restricted by an exogenously given tax system that might consist of a certain
relation between distortionary and non–distortionary revenues. With this the bureaucracy
has to bear in mind that an increase of an income tax c. p. increases the short–run budget
whereas it decreases the budget’s growth rate and thus the budget in the long run. Selﬁsh
government thus would choose a high income tax rate only if it acted shortsightedly and
reduce the level of this tax with an increase in the time horizon. The welfare effects of
such a transition are ambiguous and crucially depend on the characteristics of the public
input: while c. p. a reduction of the income tax is welfare enhancing if the public input is
totally non–rival the opposite applies for proportionally congested inputs.
This paper links the aspects mentioned above: Selﬁsh governmental behavior is intro-
duced in the framework of a growth model with a single accumulable factor and a pub-
lic input that might be congested. This is formalized via the introduction of a conges-
tion function from the public good’s literature in a Barro–type model (see e. g. Edwards
(1990) or Glomm and Ravikumar (1994)). Governmental preferences cover alternative
time horizons and the agent is confronted by a tax system in which the relation between
distorionary and non–distortionary revenues is exogenously given. Considering the wel-
fare implications it turns out that efﬁcient provision of the governmental input depends on
several inﬂuencing factors. They include the time horizon of the optimizing governmental
agent, the characteristics of the publicly provided input and the constitutional restrictions
2affecting the tax system. Static efﬁciency is a necessary condition for dynamic efﬁciency.
It is only met if simultaneously the following conditions apply: the public input is pro-
portionally congested, the income tax is the only source of governmental revenue and the
bureaucracy maximizes the long–run budget. For all other parameter constellations the
size of the government is suboptimally high whereas the growth rate might or might not be
suboptimally small. With the suboptimal governmental size the static efﬁciency condition
is violated and thus dynamic efﬁciency cannot be realized, too. Although constitutional
constraints restrict selﬁsh governmental behavior they are not apt to produce a welfare
optimum.
The course of the paper is as follows: After describing the assumptions of the model in
section 2, part 3 gives a brief overview over the ﬁrst–best optimum, the market equilib-
rium and the corresponding optimal ﬁscal policy. Section 4 introduces exogenously given
constitutional constraints and their relation to the resulting governmental size. Part 5 in-
troduces the bureaucrat’s preferences and analyzes the consequences of this behavior for
the macroeconomic performance depending on alternative planning horizons and consti-
tutional restrictions. Above, the corresponding welfare implications are discussed. The
paper closes with a short summary.
2 The model
The analysis’ starting point is a model of endogenous growth with a productive govern-
mental input. Each of the identical individuals is facing an inﬁnite planning horizon and





The function u(c) relates the ﬂow of utility to the quantity of individual consumption, c,
in each period. The discount factor, e¡bt, involves the constant rate of time preference,





; s > 0; s 6= 1 : (2)
3Labor supply is assumed to be inelastic and the constant population consists of n indi-
viduals. As the feature of congestion is analyzed within this model it is necessary to
distinguish between aggregate and individual quantities.
Each ﬁrm produces the homogeneous good, y, according to the individual production
function





; f0(¢) > 0; f00(¢) < 0; 0 <
Ga
k
< f(¢) : (3)
The production inputs are individual capital, k, and the individually available amount of
the public input, Ga. f(¢) may be interpreted as productivity function. It is assumed to
be homogenous. Capital is depreciated at the rate d. The marginal product of each input
is positive but diminishing and the production function is assumed to satisfy the Inada
conditions. The last condition in eq. (3) guarantees that output exceeds the governmental
input.
To determine the optimal consumption and accumulation decisions of the individuals, the
nature of the public input and the restrictions, if any, of availability to the individuals have
to be explained in a more detailed way. The individual’s availability of the public input
may be expressed by the congestion function1
Ga = G¢k1¡eKe¡1; e 2 [0;1] ; (4)
where K ´nk denotes the aggregate stock of capital and e measures the degree of conges-
tion: The absence of any congestion is represented by e=1, in which case the public good
is fully available to the representative agent. The other polar case, e = 0, corresponds to
proportional congestion.2 An increase in G relative to aggregate capital, K, expands indi-
vidually available amount of the public input and with this output per capita, y, in eq. (3)
1This is a typical congestion function as used within the public’s good literature (see e. g. Edwards
(1990)).
2The discussion of (partially) congested public goods is not new as can be seen e. g. by the investigations
of Buchanan (1965), Musgrave (1968), Samuelson (1969), Evans (1970) or Oakland (1969, 1972). An
introduction into growth theory can be found in Barro (1990) and was further developed e. g. by Glomm and
Ravikumar(1994), TurnovskyandFisher(1995), ? orEicherandTurnovsky(2000). Theterm’proportional
congestion’ is borrowed from ?.
4for a given amount of individual capital, k. On the other hand, an increase in K for given
G lowers the public services available to the individual ﬁrms, reduces productivity f(¢)
and hence individual output.3 If 0 < e < 1, eq. (4) just represents intermediate cases in
which the public input is subject to partial congestion.
The government provides the productive input G. Governmental production does not
exist, as the public sector buys a part of aggregate private production, Y ´ ny, and makes
it available to the individuals as a public input.4 The provision of the public input G
is ﬁnanced by duties levied to the ﬁrms. Since both inputs, private capital as well as the
publicinput, areessentialforproductiontheﬁrmscannotrenounceontheuseofthepublic
input and have to accept any ﬁnancing scheme chosen by the government. It is supposed
that the government levies proportional taxes on income and a lump sum tax. In contrast
to the tax on income, the lump sum tax has no distortionary effect on the intertemporal
allocation and hence is growth neutral whereas taxing the income reduces the decentrally
resulting growth rate.5 The budget is assumed to be balanced in each period.
3 Optimal ﬁscal policy
The ﬁrst–best optimum is characterized by the welfare maximizing growth rate f¤ as well
as the optimal expenditure ratio ( G
ny)¤ that must be realized simultaneously. Usually they
are determined by an altruistic government. The central planning problem is to maximize
the utility of the representative agent as given by eq. (1) and (2) subject to the individual
accumulation constraint




3One could alternatively assume that G has to rise in relation to total output Y in order for Ga=k to
remain constant. The results with respect to efﬁciency and optimal ﬁscal policy would be essentially the
same (see e. g. Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1998), chapter 5, for a prove).
4It is assumed that the public input G and total output Y may be transformed in a ratio of 1:1. One
could also suppose that the government disposes of the same production technology as the private ﬁrms and
produces G at its own.
5Instead of a lump sum tax a tax on consumption could be chosen to close the budget. If labor supply is
inelastic the impact of the tax on the intertemporal allocation would be the same.
5As the omniscient planner knows that aggregate capital is composed of total individual




The optimal amount of the public input is attained if the marginal beneﬁts to productivity
just match the unit resource costs of the additional government expenditure. This leads to
the necessary condition
f0(¢)ne = 1 : (7)
Maximizing over c and k and using the production function in eq. (3), the congestion func-
tion in eq. (6) as well as the optimality condition (7), the ﬁrst–best growth rate attained
















> 0 : (8)
As the level of the productivity function, f(¢), decreases with an increase in the rivalry,
the optimal growth rate depends on the existing degree of congestion, e, and is the lower
the more the public input is characterized by congestion. Another central feature of f¤
is that it depends on the level of the expenditure ratio. Considering the changes of the
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Independent of the existing level of congestion the growth rate has a maximum if the
expenditure ratio equals partial production elasticity of the public input. The optimal ex-
penditure ratio may be derived from equation (7) together with the relation Ga
k = G
ny f(¢)ne .











6with h denoting the partial production elasticity of the public input.6 Then, production
efﬁciency of the provision of the input G is realized for all levels of congestion. The ﬁrst–
best optimum thus may be characterized by eq. (8) and eq. (10). There are no transitional
dynamics and the economy initially jumps into the steady state. In steady state consump-
tion, capital, output as well as governmental expenditure grow at the same constant rate.
We now turn to the description of the market equilibrium. The existence of rivalry is
not perceived by the individuals as they consider their own decisions as negligible at the
economy–wide level. The individuals ignore that their capital accumulation increases
the stock of total capital and thereby ceteris paribus reduces the amount of the public
input available to the others. This causes congestion as long as the amount of the public
input does not increase to the same extent as private capital. A negative externality of
capital accumulation arises. Based on the congestion function (4) the individuals decide












that includes two counteracting effects: An increase in the degree of congestion c. p.
ends up in a higher growth rate whereas a higher income tax rate reduces the decentral
growth rate. In a decentralized economy, the ﬁrst–best optimum may be realized if the
government levies taxes in an appropriate way.7 The optimal income tax in this context
internalizes the external effect of capital accumulation and with this reduces the decen-
trally high growth rate as long as congestion arises. The lump sum tax then is used in
order to close the budget and to provide the efﬁcient amount of the public input.
6A graphical illustration of these relations can be found in ﬁgure 2 a–c.
7For a discussion of the impacts of different ﬁscal instruments and the role of the public sector see
e. g. Musgrave (1959), Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), Stiglitz (1986), Myles (1995) or Cornes and Sandler
(1996). A detailed derivation of the level and impact of the income tax rate and the corresponding lump
sum tax can be found e. g. by Turnovsky (2000), chapter 13.5.
74 Constitutional constraints
Within the models of public choice theory benevolent behavior of political agents is gen-
erally doubted (see e. g. Mueller (2003) for an overview). Adopting this argumentation
to the framework of a growth model the assumption of long–run welfare maximizing be-
havior of the government, represented by the social planner, now is relaxed. As the usual
social planner within this type of growth models is not restricted by any electoral con-
straints he might be interpreted most suitable as bureaucrat.8 Usually, his duty is it to
provide services to the public and to eliminate or at least alleviate any existing external
effects. To ﬁnance the corresponding expenditures the bureaucrat disposes of revenues
out of the tax system. The design of the tax system here may be interpreted in analogy to
the restrictions within the Leviathan model. The central hypothesis there is that only con-
stitutional constraints on the source of revenue or the level of expenditure can discipline
any selﬁsh government. This might be realized by a tax system that is exogenous to the
bureaucracy.9
In the following course of the paper the constitutional constraints are formalized by the
extent of income tax ﬁnancing on total revenues. These constraints are characterized by
the parameter µ = t=(G=ny) 2 [0;1] and might be interpreted as degree of distortion of
the tax system. It is modelled as continuum with µ = 0 representing a situation in which
a certain amount of the governmental input is exclusively ﬁnanced via non–distortionary
instruments. The other polar case is reﬂected by µ = 1, in which case total amount of
the governmental input is exclusively ﬁnanced by the income tax. Intermediate levels
of 0 < µ < 1 reﬂect situations consisting of a mixed ﬁnancing scheme.10 It is assumed
that the degree of distortion is exogenous to the governmental agent as well as to the
individuals. Given the preferences of the representative agent (1) and (2) together with
the production technology (3) individual optimization over k and c leads to the market
8Mueller (2003), p. 523 argues that ’governmental bureaucracies are an independent force (...).’ Sur-
veys of the bureaucracy literature can be found e. g. by Breton and Wintrobe (1974), Orzechowsky (1977),
Moe (1997) and Wintrobe (1997). A recent paper that examines the feature of bureaucratic efﬁciency is
given by Prendergast (2003).
9See e. g. Campbell (1994) for an application of this aspect.
10Tanzi and Schuhknecht (2000) provide empirical background with respect to size and composition of


















< 0 : (12)
It reﬂects the relation between expenditure ration and growth rate as perceived by the
individuals for all levels of congestion and the exogenous constitutional constraint, µ.
The growth rate c. p. increases with a rise in congestion whereas it decreases with an
increase in distortion. This growth rate gains importance with respect to two issues: First,
as usual within growth theory together with the ﬁrst–best growth rate f¤ it may be used
to derive the optimal ﬁscal policy . Second, it represents individual behavior with respect
to alternative environments and thus serves as base for selﬁsh governmental behavior.







Figure 1: First–best optima and market equilibria for alternative degrees of distortions;
The parameter settings are as follows: s = 2, b = :003, d = :05, n = 2, h = :25.
A graphical illustration of f¤ and fDµ can be found in ﬁgure 1 where the two growth rates
are plotted for alternative degrees of congestion and distortion. The solid lines represent
the relationships between f¤ and the expenditure ratio as given in eq. (8) for the bench-
mark cases of no congestion (upper curve) and proportional congestion (lower curve).
Above, there are three more functions that reﬂect fDµ for alternative extents of distor-
tionary ﬁnancing:11 The upper dashed curve represents the relation between growth rate
11The functions here are plotted for the case of proportional congestion, e = 0. If congestion is reduced
there would be no qualitative changes of the run of the curves. There are only level effects.
9and expenditure ratio if total amount of the revenues is ﬁnanced via a growth neutral in-
strument, µ = 0, the medium and lower dashed curves reﬂect a mixed ﬁnancing scheme
with µ = :5 and µ = :8 respectively. Qualitatively, these relations hold for all levels of e.
It becomes obvious that the interaction between growth rate and expenditure ratio is also
inﬂuenced by the design of the tax system: With respect to fDµ in eq. (12) the relation











The growth maximizing expenditure ratio thus is given by G
ny =
h
µ. It increases with the
extent to which the public input is ﬁnanced via a growth neutral instrument, i. e. with a
reduction in µ. As from an economic point of view the maximally possible expenditure
ratio is given by G
ny = 1, for all µ < h the growth maximizing expenditure ratio is then
given by that corner solution where total output is transformed to the governmental input.
This implies that for all µ < h the negative relation between growth rate and expendi-
ture ratio becomes relaxed over the entire domain as growth rate and expenditure ratio
are positively linked for all levels of the expenditure ratio. The economic implication
for this interdependence might be illustrated by the counteracting effects between the in-
tertemporal income and the interemporal substitution effects that arise if an increase in
the level of the public expenditure is income tax ﬁnanced: An increase of the income tax
rate reduces the after tax marginal product of capital thus inducing a negative substitu-
tion effect. Capital accumulation becomes less attractive and individuals increase current
consumption at the cost of investment. The growth rate decreases. At the same time an
increase in the income tax c. p. causes an increase of the amount of G thus increasing
capital productivity, f(¢). Accumulation is stimulated and the growth rate increases. The
two effects exactly offset each other for an income tax rate that equals partial production
elasticity of the public input. If now as a consequence of a reduction in µ the extent of
income tax ﬁnancing is reduced the growth enhancing effect of a higher G is employed.
The growth rate increases. At the same time increases the growth maximizing expenditure
ratio that equilibrates intertemporal income and substitution effect. These relations hold
for all levels of congestion.
12A derivation of that result can be found in the appendix.
105 Bureucratic preferences and welfare
We now turn to an analysis of the economic implication if the bureaucracy is assumed
to behave in a selﬁsh manner and disposes of own preferences that are borrowed from
Niskanen (1971) or Romer and Rosenthal (1978, 1979,1982). Thus it is assumed that
selﬁshness of the public agent can be modelled as maximizing the available budget.13
Within the framework of a growing economy the budget can be maximized either in the
short or in the long run. Maximizing the short–run budget is equivalent to maximizing the
budget in relation to total output in each period, i. e. the expenditure ratio. The long–run
budget increases with the budget’s growth rate. In equilibrium the budget’s growth rate
equals the growth rate of consumption. Therefore, the growth rates f¤ in eq. (8) and fDµ
in eq. (12) will serve as a base for the following argumentation concerning the budget
growth rate. A formal illustration of the government’s utility function is given by eq. (14)
and a detailed discussion of the impacts follows there.
Eq. (9) illustrates that for all levels of congestion the optimal growth rate is a function of
the expenditure ratio: There exists a relationship between short–run and long–run budget.
The growth rate increases with the expenditure ratio as long as the latter is suboptimally
low. For expenditure ratios higher than h, an increase of the expenditure ratio goes along
with a reduction of the growth rate and the trade–off between short–run and long–run
budget becomes negative. The optimal growth rate has a maximum if the public input
is efﬁciently provided with the expenditure ratio being equal to G
ny = h (see eq. (10)).
Because of
¶f¤
¶e > 0, the optimal growth rate decreases with a rise in rivalry whereas the
growthmaximizingexpenditureratioisindependentfromcongestion(seeeq.(9)). Hence,
the negative trade–off holds for all levels of congestion whenever G
ny > h. There is also a
relation between the short–run and long–run budget with respect to the decentral growth
rate, fDµ. This relation is inﬂuenced by the constitutional constraints. If the input is
exclusively ﬁnanced via an income tax, µ = 1, the negative trade–off results, as within
f¤, for all suboptimally high expenditure ratios, G
ny > h. Generally, the growth maxi-
mizing expenditure ratio increases with the extent of the non–distortionary revenues (see
13A similar discussion of a selﬁsh government in the case of a completely excludable and not at all
congested governmental input can be found in Ott (2000). In contrast to the paper here no constitutional re-
strictions are included in the argumentation and to realize a welfare optimum it is sufﬁcient if the bureaucrat
pursued the goal of long–run maximizing the budget.
11eq. (13)). Hence the negative trade–off between short–run and long–run budget results
for a higher than the optimal expenditure ratio if a part of the governmental revenues is
neutrally ﬁnanced, µ < 1. A conﬂict between maximizing short–run and long–run budget
always arises if G
ny >
h
µ. If µ · h, the negative trade–off does not apply at all. Short–run
and long–run budget may be maximized simultaneously up to G
ny = 1.
It is now analyzed how a budget maximizing bureaucracy ﬁxes the available budget de-
pending on its own preferences. With this the planning horizon of the government be-
comes an important determinant. While maximizing the long–run budget is equal to a




(see eq. (13). Independent from the level of congestion the growth rate increases with the
extent of the non–distorionary instrument. The other polar case is given by a bureaucracy
that maximizes the short–run budget, i. e. the expenditure ratio. This implies that the
bureaucracy taxes entire output and uses it as governmental input. The expenditure ratio
then equals G
ny = 1 and the corresponding level of the growth rate is determined by the
prevailing degree of distortion, µ. One may imagine that the government maximizes the
budget over an intermediate time horizon and is ready to accept a lower than the max-
imally possible expenditure ratio if at the same time the budget growth rate increases.
On the contrary it would accept a slower budgetary growth if it strongly preferred a high
level of the short–run budget. The preferences then may be described by a Cobb–Douglas
utility function in which the relative importance of long–run vs. short–run time horizons
are expressed by the exponents j and 1¡j. The level of the exponents, 0 < j < 1, may
be interpreted as intermediate time horizon with an increase in j reﬂecting a stronger
preference for the long–run budget as the budget growth rate becomes more important.
The utility function of the selﬁsh bureaucrat could be described to depend on the growth













; 0 · j · 1 ; (14)
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12It is achieved by a linear transformation of the market equilibrium growth rate in equation
(12) through the addition of the constant
b+d
s . This modiﬁcation allows for an explicit so-
lution of the maximization problem of the selﬁsh government given by eq. (14) while the
qualitative interdependencies between short–run and long–run budget remain unchanged.
Above, the resulting growth rate is positive for all expenditure ratios, G
ny 2 [0;1].14
Maximizing the utility function Ue over G


























< 0 : (16)
It is inﬂuenced by the planner’s time horizon, j, and the constitutional restriction, µ, but
not by the degree of congestion, e. For a given level of distortion, the government chooses
a lower expenditure ratio with rising importance of the long–run budget and vice versa.
Besides, for a given time horizon the expenditure ratio increases with a decrease in the
degree of distortion. The independency from the degree of congestion reﬂects a fact that
a selﬁsh bureaucracy is not per se interested in internalizing any external effect but only
takes care about his own budget.
Concerning the welfare implications the level of the expenditure ratio together with the
degree of congestion, e, becomes crucial. Alternative decisions of bureaucracy may be
evaluated by comparison with the ﬁrst–best optimum given by eq. (8) and (10) that must
be realized simultaneously. The optimal expenditure ratio is given by G
ny = h and is inde-
pendent from e and µ. It is realized if the public input is efﬁciently provided as marginal
revenues and marginal costs are equilibrated. A departure from the optimal expenditure
ratio induces efﬁciency losses that are the bigger the higher G
ny. The wedge between
marginal revenues and marginal costs increases and the welfare loss increases with the
expenditure ratio or equivalently the more important the short–run budget is to the bu-
reaucrat. While the degree of distortion inﬂuences the resulting growth rate indirectly via
theexpenditureratio, the degreeofcongestiondirectly enters the growthrate. Hence, with
respect to the welfare impact of the bureaucrat’s growth rate the existing level of rivalry
gains importance in the following manner: If congestion arises the decentrally resulting
14Note the the graphical illustration in ﬁgures 1 and 2 represent the original growth rates and expenditure
ratios that are not transformed.
13growth rate is suboptimally high. Then, from a welfare economic point of view a growth
reducing income tax rate should be used to internalize the external effect. The optimal
level of the income tax rate increases with the degree of congestion.
The welfare implications of the interdependencies between selﬁsh bureaucratic behavior
and congestion now are discussed for the benchmark case of pure income tax ﬁnancing,
µ = 1, and alternative time horizons of the selﬁsh bureaucracies. Given the preferences
in eq. (14) a selﬁsh bureaucrat would choose the optimal expenditure ratio whenever the
aim is to maximize the long–run budget (j = 1). Total amount of the governmental in-
put then is ﬁnanced via the income tax, t = h, and the ﬁrst–best expenditure ratio is
achieved. This ﬁnancing mode reduces the resulting growth rate unequivocally for all
levels of congestion. The welfare effects depend on the degree of rivalry: In case of pro-
portional congestion the welfare maximum results because the distortionary income tax
t = h reduces the suboptimally high growth rate and exactly offsets the negative external
effect arising from capital accumulation. On the contrary, in case of no congestion the
growth reducing effect of the distortionary income tax also reduces welfare because the
resulting growth rate is suboptimally low. For intermediate cases of partial congestion the
realized growth rate also is suboptimally low. If t = h, the wedge between optimal and
realized growth rate thus increases with a decreasing level of congestion. These welfare
losses increase with a reduction of congestion because the growth reducing effect of the
proportional income tax overshoots the optimal level the more the less congestion exists.
That is, although for all levels of congestion e < 1 the income tax rate basically is apt to
internalize the external effect of capital accumulation the extent of the tax rate is too big
for all levels of partial congestion. In doing so the welfare loss increases with a reduction
of congestion as this increases the wedge between optimal and actual expenditure ratio.
A welfare optimum thus results if, and only if, congestion is proportional, the bureaucrat
is a long–run budget maximizer and the income tax is the only source of governmental
revenues. The income tax rate then reduces the suboptimally high growth rate and the
revenues out of the tax are sufﬁcient to realize the optimal expenditure ratio.
The governmental budget is positively linked to the level of the income tax rate, G = tny.
Ceteris paribus the expenditure ratio increases with the level of the income tax and with
this maximizing the short–run budget equals maximizing the income tax rate, t > h. The
maximal expenditure ratio would be realized if total output is transferred to governmental
14revenue. For j = 0, the government chooses an expenditure ratio equal to ( G
ny)e = 1.15 It
departs from the point of production efﬁciency as for G
ny > h the marginal costs of provi-
sion exceed the marginal revenues of the governmental input (see eq. (7)). This induces
an overprovision of the public input and the public sector becomes suboptimally large.
The growth rate becomes zero and the economy is stationary. As consequence welfare
declines because the individuals are not able to realize their optimal intertemporal con-
sumption plans. If the bureaucrat’s time horizon is intermediate, 0 < j < 1, the described
relations hold equivalently: The expenditure ratio becomes suboptimally high thus induc-
ing reductions of the growth rate. The welfare optimum cannot be realized but the extent
of the welfare loss is less than in case of a short–run time horizon, j = 0.
A graphical illustration of the interdependencies explained up to here can be found in
ﬁgures 2 a–c. They cover the Pareto optimal relations between f¤ and G
ny (upper curves),
the decentrally resulting relations fDµ( G
ny) (lower curves)16 and an indifference curve out
of Ue for intermediate time horizons of the government, 0 < j < 1. The point P depicts
the ﬁrst–best optimum including the optimal growth rate, f¤, and the optimal expenditure
ratio, ( G
ny)¤ = h, whereas the point e describes expenditure ratios and the corresponding
growth rate chosen by the egoistic government and given the utility function (14). If
0 · j < 1, in point e the expenditure ratio is ﬁxed at a suboptimally high level, G
ny > h.
The consequences of egoistic governmental behavior unequivocally go along with welfare
losses as the government departs from an efﬁcient provision of the public input. In ﬁgure
2a–c this is reﬂected via the movement along the lower function until one reaches the
egoistic planner’s optimum as indicated by the point e. This point lies the more ’south–
east’ the lower j. For decreasing j the wedge to the optimal expenditure ratio and optimal
growth rate increases.
15These parameter combinations result for the transformed growth rate f0 given in eq. (15). The actually
resulting growth rate must be re-transformed by subtracting
d+b
s . The corresponding expenditure ratio is
smaller than one but cannot be determined explicitly. However, in a dynamic context this is not a feasible
solution as this implied a negative growth rate and in the long run a collapse of the economy (see equation
(11)). If the growth rate becomes negative the gross investment is not sufﬁcient to compensate the loss of
capital as a consequence of depreciation. The economy then enters recession. An egoistic governmental
agent who maximizes the short–run budget would make sure that the growth rate does not to become nega-
tive. For that, sensible solutions require an income tax rate that at least allows for zero growth. Graphically
this is given by the intersection of the lower curve with the horizontal axes in ﬁgure 2a–c.
16In ﬁgure 2c ’upper’ and ’lower’ functions coincide and hence are illustrated by one unique function.
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Figure 2: Welfare implications of intermediate time horizons, 0 < j < 1
To sum up: If income taxes are the only source of governmental revenues, µ = 1, a bu-
reaucreacy that seeks to maximize the growth rate of its budget would choose in any case
the optimal expenditure ratio. Financing the provision of the public input exclusively via
the income tax rate reduces the growth rate unequivocally. This goes along with welfare
losses whenever the public input is not proportionally congested. In case of a proportion-
ally congested input the welfare maximum results as the income tax, while internalizing
the external effect of capital accumulation, reduces the suboptimally high growth rate to
the optimal level. At the same time the revenues exactly correspond to the optimal amount
of the governmental input. Static efﬁciency and also dynamic efﬁciency are met. Table 5
summarizes the main results with respect to the tax system that only consists of income
taxes.
In case of a mixed tax system, µ < 1, the argumentation with respect to the interaction of
bureaucratic preferences and the budget is similar. Finally the bureaucrat’s time horizon
determines the chosen budget. The main difference is that the static efﬁciency condition
(7) is always violated because of the growth maximizing expenditure ratio that is sub-
optimally high. Hence it is impossible to realize a welfare optimum as consequence of
16e = 0 e > 0
j = 1 t = h, f = f¤ t = h, f < f¤
=) Umax
e = Wmax =) Umax
e 6= Wmax
j < 1 t > h, f = f¤ t > h, f < f¤
=) Umax
e 6= Wmax =) Umax
e 6= Wmax
Table 1: Welfare implications of alternative parameter settings if µ = 1
selﬁsh bureaucratic behavior. Even constitutional constraints are not apt to discipline the
bureaucracy.
6 Summary
This paper analyzes the effects on the growth rate and the size of government together
with the welfare implications in the context of a selﬁsh bureaucracy that provides a con-
gested production input and is confronted by alternative constitutional constraints. The
constitutional restriction is modelled as exogenously given relation between distortionary
and non–distortionary governmental revenues. It is assumed that the bureaucrat maxi-
mizes the available budget. Within a dynamic context the budget might be interpreted
either in the short, intermediate or long run. With this the time horizon of the bureau-
cracy gains importance. The short–run budget might be interpreted as expenditure ratio
whereas the long–run budget is correlated with the budget’s growth rate. There exists a
relation between the budgets in the short and the long run that is crucially inﬂuenced by
the constitutional constraints. The ﬁrst–best optimum consisting of the optimal growth
rate together with the optimal expenditure ratio serves as benchmark to assess the equi-
librium in a market economy as well as the decisions of a selﬁsh government. If the
governmental input is characterized by congestion a growth reducing income tax inter-
nalizes the negative external effect of capital accumulation. It is analyzed under which
conditions selﬁshness of the government might be apt to internalize any external effects.
It turns out that a welfare optimum results only under very speciﬁc assumptions that must
be met simultaneously: a tax system consisting only of income taxes, a productive input
17that is proportionally congested and a government that maximizes the long–run budget.
Under these assumptions the income tax internalizes the negative external effect arising
from individual capital accumulation and reducing the excessive growth rate to the opti-
mum. At the same time the amount of revenues coincides with the optimal amount of the
public input. All other combinations concerning the tax system, the degree of congestion,
the constitutional constraints as well a the time horizon of the planner violates at least one
of the two dimensions that characterize the ﬁrst–best optimum: On the one hand, a reduc-
tion in the time horizon leads to a suboptimally high expenditure ratio and with this the
static efﬁciency condition concerning the provision of the public input is not met. Inde-
pendent of the degree of congestion government in relation to the private sector becomes
suboptimally large. If on the other hand the bureaucrat maximizes his long–run budget he
also departs from an efﬁcient provision and chooses an inefﬁciently high expenditure ratio
that increases with a reduction in the part of the non–distortionary revenues. Again the
governmental sector becomes suboptimally large. The government then ﬁts the Leviathan
hypothesis but might not be disciplined, even by constitutional constraints.
Appendix
Proof of equation (13):

























If the productivity function f(¢) is homogenous the partial production elasticity of the





18For the production function (3) and the congestion function (4) the relation between the
expenditure ratio and the argument in the productivity function, Ga















[ f0(¢)ne¡µ] : (20)
Introducing the expenditure ratio as given by eq. (18) into eq. (20) the relation between
growth rate fDµ and the expenditure ratio in eq. (13) results.
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